![]() Fofana’s final mistake is failing to intercept the singular threatening crossing lane to Odsonne Édouard. Possibly the most annoying part of this would be that the assist came from the highly pestiferous Jordan Ayew, who was fouling his way all around the pitch and troubling our back line with incessant pressing. He should either step into the lane and take a tactical foul or immediate begin his own retreat to goal. Upon realising that mistake, he steps towards the ball, a wrong move with only Silva and Chilwell in cover. Any number of other passing options would be better. In the first instance, he tries to play a forward pass to Jorginho when there is no reason to force the ball back into that pressure. Fofana doesn’t cover himself in glory here On the goal, he makes three poor decisions and finds himself entirely responsible for the concession. ![]() While it should be noted that his game dramatically improved as it wore on, he also had nearly nowhere to go but up from a disastrous start. Especially as it would be inevitable that our centre backs would be often on the ball shaping into a back 2 while the fullbacks pushed on in possession, unlike Silva, Fofana initially refused to hit the ball long (diagonally, centrally, or even laying up softies to Reece James if he had pressed far down the flank.) Reece James was an animal on the right flank, offensively and defensively WhoScored?Īnd while James was unbelievable both offensively and defensively on that right side, even eventually forcing Wilfried Zaha to play on the opposite flank, Fofana would like to forget the first 15 or so minutes. That residual presence of the ball on our right side was initially disastrous for Fofana, who was visibly uncomfortable and unsure of his passing from the off. Chilwell much more often tried to link centrally than down the wing. The formation was indeed a 4-2-2-2, with a heavier dosage of attack down the right, which forced Chilwell back into a makeshift back three while the offensive nous of Reece James was maximised by pressing deeper down his flank. And in this regard, he was quite useless on this occasion, causing his removal after only 55 minutes for Ruben Loftus-Cheek. And in this regard, Jorginho was quite ineffective in general, adding an abysmal 76% pass completion rate. In fact, aside from Mateo Kovačić with 10, Silva had the second most progressive passes (9), while Jorginho sits at a lowly one (though he did attempt a few more). There was also significantly more urgency in our passes, and long balls were being attempted by both holding midfielders and Thiago Silva, whose accuracy was simply outstanding. This time around there was a bit more of a traditional back four, but Potter is certainly tasking his back line to shift according to the attacking side. With personnel not dissimilar to the lineup fielded against Salzburg, the only changes being Wesley Fofana for César Azpilicueta (to counter the speed of Wilfried Zaha) and Ben Chilwell for an ill Marc Cucurella, it wouldn’t have been surprising to see that same shape to this squad. Patrick Vieira had to make slight adjustments through the opening minutes to deal with Potter’s compacted midfield, as Mount and Havertz were dipping in between the lines of the defense and midfield to offer passing lanes. Pleasantly, the ability to confuse not just punditry but opposition in regards to a starting XI is fantastic. This squad does seemingly have the ability to do that, if properly coached in it. At Brighton, he often switched between three and four at the back depending on the flow of the game. Known for tactical flexibility, there were predictions of a 4-3-3, 4-2-3-1, 4-2-2-2 (correctly), and even, per the American broadcast, a 3-5-2 projected once the starting names were announced. While at times predicting a Thomas Tuchel formation was difficult, Graham Potter will likely throw us for a loop more often.
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